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H33 H33 / Session / Public Verifier
H33 Session · Public Verifier

One receipt verifies the meeting. Tamper it — REJECT.

Drag any H33 Session .h33pqv.json file below. We’ll check the canonical hash and verify all three post-quantum signature families (ML-DSA-87, SLH-DSA-256s, FALCON). PERMIT or REJECT in two seconds.

No login · no account · no sales call · just proof

Or drop a .h33pqv.json file. Or paste it here:

Drag-and-drop runs entirely in your browser; verification runs on H33’s public demo verifier (Phase A backend at auth.h33.ai). The artifact contents are not stored.

What this means

Status
Integrity
Metadata Exposure
Classification
Artifact

Receipt narrative

Claim
Evidence
Cryptographic verification details
Canonical hash match The recomputed SHA3-384 over the canonical body matches the stored hash.
ML-DSA-87 NIST FIPS 204 · lattice (Module-LWE) · NIST L5
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256s NIST FIPS 205 · hash-based (SPHINCS+) · NIST L5
FALCON NIST draft · NTRU lattice
substrate verdict: threshold: tenant: signing: triple_pq_2_of_3 storage: persistence:

Why "no login, no account"

If verifying a receipt required an account at H33, the receipt’s independence would be a lie. The verifier is public so the artifact can be checked by buyers, auditors, regulators, and adversaries on equal footing.

Why three signature families

The bundle is valid when at least two of three independent post-quantum hardness assumptions verify. Future obsolescence of one family doesn’t invalidate your receipt; compromise of two independently does.

Why drag-and-drop matters

This is the proof: any single byte changed after signing is caught by the canonical hash AND rejected by every signature family. Try the tampered sample to see it.