H33
Patent Disclosure · May 2026
H33-Agent-Zero
A classification server evaluates a trained model on a feature vector that is never decrypted. Homomorphic mult / add / rotation produce an encrypted score vector under Ring-LWE; a confidence-boundary controller decides what — if anything — gets disclosed; a multi-family post-quantum attestation cryptographically binds the decision to the document without re-evaluation, without plaintext access.
Discrete label only.
Encrypted domain conversion from approximate-arithmetic ciphertexts → Boolean-gate ciphertexts. Encrypted argmax runs over the score vector. Server returns the label.
Encrypted Boolean.
Encrypted threshold comparison: does the top score exceed a policy-defined cutoff? Server returns an encrypted Boolean, not a label, not a score.
Score vector returned encrypted.
Server returns the full encrypted score vector unmodified. Decryption happens at the client boundary under the data owner's secret key.
Module-LWE lattice
Module Learning With Errors. Primary signature family in the attestation record.
NTRU lattice SIS
NTRU lattice Short Integer Solution. Independent of Module-LWE — a separate lattice assumption with different geometric structure.
Stateless hash-based
Security from stateless hash functions only. No lattice assumption at all. Survives any future lattice-specific attack.
- Receive an encrypted feature vector under FHE; server holds only public + evaluation keys; secret key never leaves the data owner
- Evaluate trained classification model via homomorphic mult / add / rotation; all intermediate values remain ciphertext (Ring-LWE)
- Confidence boundary policy with three modes: hard classification (argmax), threshold proof (Boolean), customer decrypt — disclosure is itself a cryptographic decision
- Post-quantum attestation under three mutually-independent signature schemes; verifiable without re-evaluation and without plaintext access
- Multi-tenant isolation by computational infeasibility of Ring-LWE decryption — not by policy enforcement, not by ACL, not by trust
- Workflow attestation chain forms a DAG; each record includes hash of immediately prior; domain separation registry prevents cross-domain replay
- Cross-system portability of the attestation record — downstream systems verify and enforce without re-running classification or re-exposing plaintext
- Time-bound classification with reclassification triggers; deletion attestation proves removal; encrypted feedback channel for corrections