Related · tier-1 reading. For the privacy story end-to-end — FHE + STARK proof + portable artifact, see Privacy Layer.
Banks, custodians, and regulated entities need privacy they can prove compliance for.
Institutional digital asset participation requires two things that existing infrastructure cannot provide simultaneously: competitive privacy and regulatory compliance. H33 delivers both.
The Privacy Layer owns the concept — institutional privacy reinforces it, never redefines it.
H33-74 is designed to attest each proof with three post-quantum families and anchor a 32-byte commitment.
STARK zero-knowledge proof (ZK), minimization, and selective disclosure. Encrypted compute (FHE) is a separate data-in-use mechanism, used only where genuinely required.
Designed for examiners and counterparties to confirm attestations with the public verifier (not yet available for production receipts) — see Verification.
Competitors monitor your wallets. Counterparties front-run your trades. Portfolio positions become public intelligence. Institutional participation means institutional exposure.
Tornado Cash: sanctioned. Mixers: flagged by compliance tools. Privacy chains: no regulatory framework. No existing privacy tool satisfies institutional compliance requirements.
STARK proofs verify that regulatory requirements are satisfied without revealing the underlying positions, trades, or counterparties. The institution maintains competitive privacy. The regulator maintains compliance visibility. Neither compromises for the other.
Process wire transfers and cross-border payments privately while producing per-transaction AML compliance attestations.
Protect portfolio positions and strategy while proving fiduciary compliance and investment mandate adherence.
Process claims and manage reserves privately while proving actuarial soundness and regulatory capital adequacy.
Protect order flow and trading activity while proving market surveillance and manipulation monitoring compliance.
STARK proof generated from compliance claim. H33-74 is designed to attest with three PQ families. 32-byte commitment anchored on-chain. Full proof stored in Cachee.
Any party verifies independently. On-chain commitment check, H33-74 signature verification, or full STARK proof verification via the public HATS verifier.
When attestation approaches epoch expiry, institution re-attests. New proof generated, new commitment anchored. Previous attestation remains in the audit trail.
Circumstances change. Attestation revoked immediately. On-chain status updated. All verifiers see revocation in real time. Compliance state changes take effect instantly.
Attestations are time-bound, revocable, and portable. Compliance is continuous, not static. Evidence is exportable for audits, litigation, and regulatory examinations.
H33-74 attests with three independent mathematical hardness assumptions: MLWE lattices (ML-DSA), NTRU lattices (FALCON), and stateless hash functions (SLH-DSA). Breaks only if all three are simultaneously broken.
The three PQ families are NIST-standardized or in NIST standardization (FIPS 204 and 205 final; FALCON as FN-DSA, FIPS 206 draft). Not experimental. Not academic. H33 is designed to bind evidence using three independent post-quantum signature families: ML-DSA, FALCON and SLH-DSA. Full three-family production verification remains pending completion and independent qualification of the FALCON repair.
STARK proofs are hash-based and post-quantum secure by construction. No elliptic curve assumptions. No pairing-based cryptography. Only collision-resistant hash functions under SHA3-256.
Adversaries are capturing encrypted institutional data today, waiting for quantum computers to decrypt it later. Compliance evidence signed with classical cryptography is already being harvested. The migration deadline is not when quantum computers arrive -- it was years ago.
Selective disclosure for regulated entities: a required claim is proven and verifiable while positions, order flow, counterparties, and client identities stay inside the institution.
The institution-type claims — AML, fiduciary, actuarial, surveillance — and their examiners are specific to regulated finance. The proof machinery is shared across the platform.
The 74-byte post-quantum attestation: three-family PQ signatures (by design), signer set, timestamp, authority scope, governance link. See H33-74.
A combination: STARK ZK proof, minimization, and selective disclosure. FHE only where encrypted compute is genuinely in the workflow — a distinct data-in-use mechanism.
The chain gives permanence and public ordering for the 32-byte commitment only — an anchoring surface the evidence anchors to. It provides no privacy, no attestation, no compliance determination.
Recompute the commitment with the public verifier (signature verification of production receipts is not yet available). See Verification.
Prefer FHE when the requirement is computation over data that stays encrypted end to end, rather than proving a claim about it.
Use institutional privacy when a regulated entity must show an examiner or counterparty that a requirement is satisfied — AML, fiduciary, actuarial soundness, market surveillance — while positions, order flow, and client data stay private. It supports the institution's compliance program; it does not replace the institution's own compliance determination.
Do not use it when the need is computation over data that stays encrypted end to end — route to /fhe/, a different (data-in-use) mechanism. Do not read an attestation as a statement that an institution "is compliant" — it proves a bounded claim; the compliance conclusion belongs to the institution and its regulators. For property-level DeFi checks, see DeFi Privacy.
Institutional privacy is the expression of the Privacy Layer for regulated entities in which competitive information — positions, order flow, counterparties, client identities — is protected while a required claim is proven. The institution keeps competitive privacy; the counterparty or examiner gets a verifiable claim, not the data behind it. It supports a compliance program but does not by itself make an institution compliant.
No. An attestation proves a bounded claim — for example that AML screening was completed or that reserves were adequate at a point in time. Whether the institution is compliant overall is a separate determination made by the institution and its regulators. The privacy techniques provide verifiable evidence that supports that determination; they do not replace it.
Primarily a STARK zero-knowledge proof plus minimization and selective disclosure, attested by H33-74. Where the workflow genuinely requires computing on data that stays encrypted end to end, fully homomorphic encryption may participate — but FHE is a distinct data-in-use mechanism documented at /fhe/. If encrypted compute is your actual need, start there.
The chain contributes permanence and public ordering for a 32-byte commitment only — an anchoring surface the evidence anchors to, never owns. It provides no privacy or compliance of its own. Independent verification of the evidence (recomputing the commitment and checking the three post-quantum signatures with the public verifier) is not yet available for production receipts; see Verification.
Privacy for competitive protection. Compliance for regulatory requirements. Post-quantum signatures for evidence.
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