A compact, customer-trained classifier that runs entirely on encrypted data. The document is encrypted with CKKS FHE before the classifier touches it. At no point does any system — including H33 — see the plaintext.
AI copilots ingest contracts. Vendors process financials. Tools scan PII for compliance. Every one of them requires access to your plaintext at some point. That access is the exposure.
The document never decrypts. The classifier's weights operate as polynomial coefficients in the RLWE ring. The inference IS a homomorphic computation. The output IS a ciphertext.
Tokenization is a band-aid. It requires reading the document to decide what to mask. Agent-Zero never reads the document. FHE is the enabling technology. CKKS lets you run neural network inference on ciphertexts.
The inference IS a homomorphic computation. The output IS a ciphertext. The AI doesn't avoid reading your data — it is mathematically incapable of doing so.
The encrypted score vector exists inside the ciphertext, but H33 cannot read it without the customer's boundary decision. Confidence disclosure is optional and customer-controlled.
Customers define their own classification taxonomy, train on their own labeled examples, and deploy weights to H33. We never see the training data. We never see the taxonomy. The model is private.
Any industry where documents contain sensitive data and classification is required. Agent-Zero eliminates the exposure that every other classification system accepts as inevitable.
Every classification runs on CKKS approximate arithmetic FHE, optimized for ML inference on encrypted vectors. Every output is attested by three independent cryptographic families.
| Scheme | CKKS (Approximate Arithmetic) |
| SIMD Slots | 4,096 per ciphertext |
| Multiply + Relin | 14,341 µs |
| Dot Product (4 terms) | 23,636 µs |
| Hardware | AWS Graviton4 (ARM) |
| Operation Planner | 75-87% relin reduction |
| Security Basis | RLWE lattice problem |
| Attestation Size | 74 bytes (32 on-chain + 42 Cachee) |
| Key 1 | ML-DSA-65 (lattice) |
| Key 2 | FALCON-512 (NTRU lattice) |
| Key 3 | SLH-DSA (hash-based) |
| Security Model | Three independent hardness assumptions |
| Method | Distillation (not compression) |
| Patent | Pending — 144 claims |
| Input | Encrypted feature vector (CKKS) |
| Default Output | Hard classification tag |
| Confidence Modes | 3 (Hard / Threshold / Decrypt) |
| Taxonomy | Customer-defined |
| Training | Customer-side, private |
| Feedback Loop | Human override + retrain |
| Plaintext Exposure | None. Zero. Never. |
| Step 1 | Document → Feature Vector |
| Step 2 | FHE Encrypt (client-side) |
| Step 3 | CKKS Classify (server, encrypted) |
| Step 4 | H33-74 Attest (3-key PQ) |
| Step 5 | Policy Engine → Tags |
| Step 6 | Customer receives tag |
| Server Access | Ciphertexts only |
The document never decrypts. The classifier never reads. The attestation is post-quantum. This is what AI security looks like when the AI IS the cryptography.