H33: Post-Quantum Identity
and Authentication Platform

H33 is a fully post-quantum secure identity and authentication platform that executes a complete cryptographic pipeline — Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) biometric matching, zero-knowledge proof verification, and ML-DSA (Dilithium) attestation — in a single API call averaging 50 microseconds per authentication. The platform achieves 1.2 million sustained authentications per second on AWS Graviton4 hardware while maintaining NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) compliance at every layer.

H33 introduces a three-token economic model on Solana: Token B (economic utility and deflationary burns), Token C (soulbound identity with hybrid post-quantum binding), and Token D (document attestation and encrypted credential management). Together, these components form a vertically integrated identity stack where biometric data is never decrypted during verification, private keys are split across threshold authorities, and on-chain identity is quantum-resistant from issuance through recovery.

Introduction

The emergence of cryptographically relevant quantum computers poses an existential threat to public-key infrastructure underpinning digital identity, authentication, and document security. RSA, ECDSA, and ECDH — the foundations of TLS, SSH, and blockchain signatures — are vulnerable to Shor's algorithm on a sufficiently large quantum computer. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalized its first post-quantum cryptographic standards in 2024: ML-KEM (Kyber) for key encapsulation and ML-DSA (Dilithium) for digital signatures.

H33 addresses this threat comprehensively. Rather than retrofitting post-quantum algorithms onto classical architectures, H33 was designed from the ground up with lattice-based security at every layer:

• Biometric data is encrypted using BFV Fully Homomorphic Encryption and never leaves the encrypted domain during matching. The FHE scheme’s security derives from the hardness of the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem.
• Key exchange uses ML-KEM (Kyber768) at NIST Security Level 3, encapsulated with AES-256-GCM for symmetric encryption of data in transit and at rest.
• Digital signatures use ML-DSA-65 (Dilithium3) in a hybrid scheme with Ed25519, providing defense-in-depth: both algorithms must be broken to compromise authentication.
• Zero-knowledge proofs use hash-based STARK lookups with SHA3-256 commitments, avoiding elliptic curve pairings entirely.
• On-chain identity binds soulbound tokens to dual-key pairs (Ed25519 + Dilithium), ensuring blockchain identity survives the quantum transition.

Threat Model and Design Principles

2.1 Adversary Capabilities

2.2 Design Principles

Cryptographic Pipeline

The H33 authentication pipeline executes three stages in a single API call:

3.1 BFV Fully Homomorphic Encryption

H33 implements the Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) scheme for integer arithmetic on encrypted data. The production configuration uses parameters tuned for biometric inner-product computation:

Key Generation

The secret key is sampled as a ternary polynomial (coefficients in {-1, 0, 1}) and stored in NTT form for efficient multiplication during decryption. The public key is computed as pk0 = -(a · sk + e) and pk1 = a, where a is uniformly random and e is sampled from a Centered Binomial Distribution. Both components are pre-converted to NTT form at key generation time, eliminating a forward NTT per encryption.

Encryption

All polynomial multiplications use NTT-domain pointwise multiplication with Montgomery reduction. Ciphertexts are stored in coefficient form after inverse NTT.

Homomorphic Operations

The biometric pipeline requires one subtraction and one multiplication (depth-1 circuit). Addition and subtraction are element-wise in coefficient form. Multiplication uses NTT-domain pointwise multiply followed by relinearization. The single-modulus configuration provides sufficient noise budget for the depth-1 computation with a comfortable safety margin verified through production noise profiling.

3.2 Number Theoretic Transform

The NTT is the computational bottleneck of BFV operations. H33 implements a radix-4 Cooley-Tukey NTT with Montgomery arithmetic, achieving 25% fewer operations than the standard radix-2 butterfly.

3.3 SIMD Batching Architecture

BFV supports SIMD operations through the Chinese Remainder Theorem when the plaintext modulus satisfies t ≡ 1 (mod 2N). With t = 65537 and N = 4096, the ring decomposes into 4096 independent plaintext slots. H33 packs biometric feature vectors (128 dimensions each) into these slots:

Batch verification is constant-time: approximately 1.04 ms for 1 to 32 users. Whether the batch contains 1 or 32 active users, the cryptographic cost is identical.

3.4 Threshold Decryption (k-of-n)

H33 splits the FHE secret key across multiple authority nodes using Shamir secret sharing over the polynomial ring. A configurable threshold of authorities must participate in decryption — fewer than the threshold learn nothing about the secret key or biometric data. This is the information-theoretic guarantee of Shamir’s scheme.

Each participating authority computes a partial decryption using its key share. The combiner collects partial decryptions and reconstructs the full decryption via Lagrange interpolation with constant-time modular arithmetic (Fermat's little theorem for modular inverse).

Every threshold decryption produces a SHA3-256 transcript binding all ciphertext hashes, partial decryption hashes, participating party indices, and the final similarity score. This transcript is verifiable by any auditor without access to plaintext biometric data.

3.5 Zero-Knowledge Lookup Proofs

H33 implements hash-based zero-knowledge proofs using SHA3-256 commitments. Unlike SNARK/STARK systems that rely on elliptic curve pairings, H33’s ZK lookups derive their security entirely from the collision resistance of SHA3-256 — a property believed to hold against quantum adversaries.

Proofs demonstrate that a biometric similarity score falls within a valid range and exceeds a verification threshold, without revealing the underlying biometric data. Verification requires three hash comparisons and completes in approximately 0.067 microseconds.

3.6 ML-DSA Batch Attestation

Every authentication produces a Dilithium signature attesting to the match result. H33 batches attestation: a single Dilithium sign-and-verify operation covers all users in a SIMD batch, reducing per-user attestation cost by up to 31× compared to individual signing.

Post-Quantum Cryptographic Primitives

4.1 ML-KEM (Kyber) Key Encapsulation

All key exchange operations use Kyber768 (ML-KEM-768), providing NIST Security Level 3 (equivalent to AES-192). Kyber’s security is based on the Module Learning With Errors (MLWE) problem.

4.2 ML-DSA (Dilithium) Signatures

H33 uses Dilithium3 (ML-DSA-65) as the default signature scheme, with support for all three NIST levels:

4.3 Hybrid Encryption

All data encryption uses a hybrid scheme combining Kyber key encapsulation with AES-256-GCM symmetric encryption. The encapsulated shared secret is expanded via HKDF with SHA3-256 and domain-separated context tags to derive the AES key and nonce. Domain separation prevents cross-module replay attacks: biometric, messaging, and document encryption contexts produce distinct keys from the same shared secret.

4.4 Hybrid Signing

H33 implements a hybrid signature scheme combining ML-DSA-65 (post-quantum) with Ed25519 (classical). Both signatures must verify for acceptance, providing defense-in-depth. The production default uses nested signing: the Dilithium signature covers the Ed25519 signature, creating a cryptographic dependency where forging either component requires breaking both algorithms.

Biometric Authentication System

5.1 Encrypted Biometric Matching

H33’s biometric pipeline computes cosine similarity between feature vectors entirely in the encrypted domain. At no point during verification does any party — including the server, the threshold authorities, or the client — hold a plaintext biometric template.

Enrollment

1. Extract feature vector from biometric capture
2. L2-normalize to unit sphere
3. Quantize to integers with safe scaling (prevents modular overflow during inner product)
4. Pack into SIMD slots (up to 32 users per ciphertext)
5. BFV encrypt with public key
6. Store encrypted template — plaintext is discarded and never persisted

Verification

1. Encrypt fresh probe using same procedure
2. Compute encrypted difference: ct_diff = ct_enrolled - ct_probe
3. Compute encrypted squared distance: ct_sq = ct_diff × ct_diff
4. Threshold decrypt via k-of-n collective authority
5. Decode similarity score from plaintext slots
6. Compare against threshold

5.2 Collective Authority Protocol

Each authority holds only its Shamir share of the secret key. The combiner performs Lagrange interpolation to reconstruct the decryption without ever reconstructing the secret key itself.

5.3 Anti-Spoofing and Liveness Detection

H33 implements multi-modal anti-spoofing with challenge-response protocols including facial landmark tracking, depth confidence scoring, temporal consistency analysis, and deepfake detection. Risk-adaptive session management adjusts challenge difficulty and timeout based on detected threat level. Liveness challenges include blink detection, head movement, expression recognition, and voice verification.

5.4 Dynamic Request Batching

H33 employs a dynamic batching system that accumulates authentication requests within a short time window and dispatches them as a single SIMD-packed FHE operation. This ensures individual requests complete with minimal latency while heavy load saturates all 32 SIMD slots for maximum throughput.

Token B: Economic Layer

Token B is the economic backbone of the H33 ecosystem, implemented as a Solana Token 2022 program with a fixed maximum supply and built-in deflationary mechanics.

6.1 Supply and Distribution

Total supply: 21 billion tokens with 6 decimal places. All tokens are minted during two distribution phases, after which the mint authority is permanently and irrevocably revoked. No additional tokens can ever be created.

6.2 Deflationary Burn Mechanics

Token B implements a three-tiered burn system that permanently removes tokens from circulation:

• Revenue Burns (Stage-Based): The Revenue Burn Reserve (5.25B tokens) is burned across 7 stages, each triggered by verified revenue milestones. Stages must complete sequentially. Stage 7 burns whatever remains in the vault, ensuring complete depletion.
• Unclaimed Rewards Burns: When advancing to the next stage, all unclaimed customer rewards from the current stage are permanently burned, creating urgency for claims.
• Transfer Fee Burns: 70% of all collected transfer fees are permanently burned.

6.3 Transfer Fee Architecture

Every Token B transfer incurs a 1% fee, enforced at the protocol level via the Token 2022 TransferFeeConfig extension. Fees are withheld automatically at transfer time:

6.4 Customer Rewards and Merkle Claims

Customer rewards (3.15B tokens) are distributed via Merkle tree proofs with Token C identity verification. Rewards are released in stages, with 50% available in Stage 1 and progressively smaller allocations in subsequent stages. Claims require:

1. A valid Merkle proof against the published root (double-hashed to prevent second-preimage attacks)
2. An active, unlocked Token C soulbound identity (cross-program verification)
3. A matching source vault for the reward round

Each claimant can claim once per round, enforced by on-chain PDA derivation.

6.5 Quarterly Enforcement

Token B enforces a 90-day cadence for customer reward distribution. The fee processing instruction rejects execution if more than 90 days have elapsed since the last reward round creation. This on-chain constraint ensures that fee revenue cannot accumulate indefinitely without corresponding customer rewards.

Token C: Soulbound Identity

Token C implements non-transferable Soulbound Tokens (SBTs) that anchor on-chain identity to post-quantum cryptographic keys, biometric hashes, and verifiable credentials.

7.1 Non-Transferable SBT Mechanics

Token C’s non-transferability is enforced at the Solana token program level:

1. At identity initialization, a PDA-controlled mint creates exactly 1 NFT (0 decimals)
2. The NFT is minted to the owner’s associated token account
3. The token account is immediately frozen via the Solana token program
4. The freeze authority is held by the mint PDA, controlled exclusively by the Token C program
5. Frozen accounts cannot be transferred, even by the owner

7.2 Hybrid Post-Quantum Binding

Each identity is cryptographically bound to a dual-key pair at mint time:

The nested signature creates a cryptographic dependency: Dilithium signs the Ed25519 signature, ensuring that forging the identity binding requires breaking both algorithms. An optional triple-signed mode adds a FALCON-512 hash for additional future-proofing.

7.3 Multi-Factor Authentication

Token C supports five MFA factor types, including post-quantum options:

The identity owner configures a threshold, and authentication requires that many distinct factor types to verify. This enables configurations like “require any 3 of: Ed25519 + Dilithium + biometric + TOTP” for high-security accounts.

7.4 Guardian Recovery Protocol

Identity recovery uses a multi-signature guardian system with dual-key commitments. Each guardian’s classical and quantum keys are bound at registration time via a hash commitment. Recovery requires threshold guardian approval, with each approval verified against the stored dual-key commitment. This prevents guardian substitution attacks where an adversary replaces a guardian’s quantum key.

The recovery flow thaws the old token account, transfers the NFT to the new owner, and refreezes at the new account — maintaining soulbound properties throughout.

7.5 Zero-Knowledge Identity Proofs

• Age Verification: Proves the holder is above a minimum age without revealing date of birth
• Data Access Authorization: ZK proofs for compliance-gated access with expiration and purpose fields
• Travel/Event Access: Time-limited access proofs for identity verification at points of entry

All proofs use SHA3-256 SPARK Lookups — no elliptic curves, no pairings, fully post-quantum.

Token D: Document Attestation

8.1 Content Attestation and Versioning

Documents are stored off-chain. On-chain, Token D stores a Keccak-256 content hash that cryptographically binds the off-chain content to an immutable audit trail. Every update creates an append-only version entry recording the content hash, timestamp, editor identity, and change description. Version history cannot be deleted, providing a complete forensic audit trail.

8.2 Role-Based Access Control

Access can be granted with time-based expiration, share links with revocation, and collection-based grouping.

8.3 Private NFTs with ZK Proofs

Token D supports private NFTs that prove document properties without revealing content. Private NFT operations (create, transfer, spend) require valid SPARK Lookup proofs, enabling privacy-preserving document transfers where the content remains confidential and the proof demonstrates ownership and validity. Spent NFTs are marked with a nullifier to prevent double-spending.

8.4 Staking and Mining Rewards

Document holders can stake documents to earn Token B rewards. A minimum staking period applies, with early withdrawal forfeiting pending rewards. A referral system provides bonus rewards for introducing new users to the ecosystem. Milestone rewards (in Token D) incentivize first-time staking and community fraud detection.

Three-Token Ecosystem Integration

• Token B → Token C: Token B can be staked into a Token C identity, increasing trust score and access level. Staked Token B acts as reputation collateral.
• Token C → Token B: Token B reward claims require a valid, active Token C soulbound identity (cross-program verification).
• Token C → Token D: Token C identities can be granted time-limited access to Token D documents with configurable access levels and expiration.
• Token D → Token B: Document staking earns Token B mining rewards. The referral system creates viral growth incentives.
• Token B → Token D: Token B serves as the payment currency for Token D premium services.

Security Analysis

10.1 Post-Quantum Security Summary

10.2 FHE Security Margin

The BFV ciphertext modulus is substantially below the Homomorphic Encryption Standard’s maximum for the chosen ring dimension, providing over 50 bits of security margin above the 128-bit target. All parameters have been validated against the HE Standard and lattice estimator tools.

10.3 Side-Channel Resistance

All secret-dependent comparisons use constant-time implementations via the subtle crate. This includes share verification, field arithmetic, proof verification, modular inverse computation, and challenge-response validation. No branching on secret-dependent values occurs in any cryptographic code path.

10.4 Soulbound Token Security

Token C’s SBT security relies on three independent mechanisms:

1. Solana token-level freeze: Protocol-enforced; no application logic can bypass
2. Dual-key binding: Identity bound to both Ed25519 and Dilithium at mint
3. Guardian threshold: Recovery requires multi-guardian consensus with dual-key verification

Performance

11.1 Single API Call Latency

11.2 Sustained Throughput

11.3 Production Hardware

11.4 Native AI Security Agents

H33 includes three Rust-native AI agents executing in-line with authentication requests:

KYC and Compliance

KYC data is stored off-chain with on-chain hash commitments in the Token C identity account. The biometric template hash enables re-verification without storing plaintext biometric data. The FHE architecture is particularly well-suited for HIPAA compliance, as Protected Health Information in biometric templates is never decrypted during processing.

Compliance readiness: SOC 2, HIPAA, PCI DSS.

Infrastructure and Deployment

13.1 AWS Architecture

• Compute: ECS on Graviton4 (c8g.metal-48xl for crypto, standard for API)
• Database: RDS PostgreSQL for user management and session state
• Cache: ElastiCache Redis for session tokens and rate limiting
• Load Balancing: Application Load Balancer with TLS 1.3
• Storage: S3 with server-side encryption for documents
• Secrets: AWS Secrets Manager for key material
• Monitoring: CloudWatch metrics and logging

13.2 AWS Marketplace

H33 is available on AWS Marketplace as a SaaS product with usage-based metering across 7 dimensions: 4 authentication levels (base, H33-128, H-256, cached) and 3 KYC tiers (basic, enhanced, full AML).

13.3 Blockchain

Token programs deploy on Solana mainnet using the Anchor framework for safe account deserialization and constraint validation. All three programs are independently audited.

13.4 Test Coverage

1,628 tests passing across the full stack, covering FHE roundtrips, threshold decryption, biometric matching accuracy, all token program instructions, anti-spoofing protocols, ZK proof verification, hybrid encryption/signing, and constant-time property verification.

Conclusion

H33 represents a comprehensive approach to post-quantum identity and authentication. By building on lattice-based cryptography at every layer — from FHE biometric matching to Kyber key exchange to Dilithium signatures — the platform provides security guarantees that hold against both classical and quantum adversaries.

The three-token ecosystem on Solana creates an economically sustainable model: Token B provides deflationary utility with built-in burn mechanics and transfer fees; Token C anchors identity to post-quantum soulbound tokens with multi-factor authentication and guardian recovery; Token D enables document attestation with privacy-preserving proofs and community-incentivized fraud detection.

The production system achieves 1.2 million authentications per second on standard cloud hardware, with each authentication executing a complete cryptographic pipeline in approximately 50 microseconds.

References

1. NIST. Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization. FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), 2024.
2. Brakerski, Z. Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Modulus Switching from Classical GapSVP. CRYPTO 2012.
3. Fan, J. and Vercauteren, F. Somewhat Practical Fully Homomorphic Encryption. IACR ePrint 2012/144.
4. Albrecht, M., et al. Homomorphic Encryption Standard. HomomorphicEncryption.org, 2018.
5. Shamir, A. How to Share a Secret. Communications of the ACM, 1979.
6. Montgomery, P. Modular Multiplication Without Trial Division. Mathematics of Computation, 1985.
7. Harvey, D. Faster Arithmetic for Number-Theoretic Transforms. Journal of Symbolic Computation, 2014.
8. Lyubashevsky, V., et al. CRYSTALS-Dilithium: A Lattice-Based Digital Signature Scheme. TCHES 2018.
9. Bos, J., et al. CRYSTALS-Kyber: A CCA-Secure Module-Lattice-Based KEM. Euro S&P 2018.