It exists because every service that calls an API holds that key in plaintext somewhere — the moment of use is the exposure. H33-Gateway removes the raw key from the caller entirely and leaves a portable, verifiable record of who used it.
Related · tier-1 reading. For what a portable artifact actually is, see Portable Artifact.
Every API call to Stripe, AWS, Twilio, SendGrid — your servers hold plaintext credentials in memory. One memory dump, one compromised dependency, one misconfigured log, and those keys are exposed. Vaults protect storage. VPNs protect the network. But the moment the key is actually used — the API call itself — the credential is naked in your application memory.
H33-Gateway runs API calls inside a Trusted Execution Environment. Your encrypted key goes in. The plaintext exists only inside the secure enclave. The response comes back. Your infrastructure never touches the raw credential.
Start BuildingVPNs protect the network. Vaults protect storage. But nothing protects the moment a key is actually used — the API call itself. Your application decrypts the credential, loads it into memory, attaches it to an HTTP header, and sends it over the wire. For that entire window, the plaintext exists in your infrastructure. H33-Gateway closes that gap. The credential is decrypted inside a hardware-isolated enclave, the API call is made from within the TEE, and the response is returned encrypted. Your servers never see the raw key.
Zero-exposure API calls. Post-quantum encrypted transit.
H33 Products · API Credential Protection
H33-Gateway is an API credential-protection product. It secures every API key, token, and secret that touches your infrastructure by keeping the plaintext credential inside a hardware-isolated enclave and never in your application memory. It owns the credential-in-use protection workflow, the developer integration experience, and the zero-exposure outcome. It does not own, redefine, or reimplement the key custody, cryptography, evidence, verification, or governance it relies on; it composes them.
The product boundary. H33-Gateway owns the API-credential protection workflow and outcome. It uses H33 mechanisms for key custody, evidence, verification, and governance; it does not redefine or own those mechanisms.
H33-Key owns custody of the encrypted credential and its rotation. Gateway consumes that custody so a decrypted key exists only briefly inside the enclave; it does not define or own key custody itself.
H33-74 supplies the portable post-quantum attestation behind every Dilithium-signed audit record. Gateway attaches these attestations to each proxied call; it does not produce the attestation primitive.
Verification is what lets any third party independently confirm the TEE remote-attestation proof — that the right code ran in a genuine enclave. Gateway requests and surfaces that verdict; the verifying is owned elsewhere.
Agent-008 governs any automated agent that calls through the Gateway — preserving authority and preventing drift over what a credential may be used for. Gateway is governed by it; it does not perform governance.
If the Gateway swapped Kyber-1024 for another post-quantum KEM, or ran in a different TEE, it would still be H33-Gateway: the credential-in-use protection workflow and zero-exposure outcome are the product. Mechanisms are chosen, not owned.
Kyber-1024 decapsulation + TEE execution + third-party API call + Dilithium audit signature — added overhead under 50ms.
Volume-tiered pricing — standardized across the H33 platform.
See pricing →| H33-Gateway | Direct API Call | Secrets Manager + Call | HSM + Call | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Plaintext in app memory | Never | Always | During call | During call |
| Post-quantum transit | Kyber-1024 | No | No | No |
| Hardware isolation | TEE enclave | No | No | HSM only (no proxy) |
| Audit trail | Dilithium-signed | App logs | CloudTrail | HSM logs |
| Credential rotation | Zero-downtime | Redeploy | Redeploy | Redeploy |
| Added latency | <50ms | 0ms | ~5ms | ~10ms |
All units fungible — same balance as H33-Auth, H33-Vault, H33-Key, H33-Shield, and H33-Share.
Use H33-Gateway when the risk is a credential being exposed at the moment it is used — plaintext API keys, tokens, and secrets sitting in application memory during an outbound call. The TEE proxy, encrypted transit, and Dilithium-signed audit trail are live; TEE remote attestation is independently verifiable. Any latency or overhead figures shown are illustrative — verify current numbers on /benchmarks/.
When NOT to use it — use a neighbor instead. If you need to prove that upstream systems actually recorded what they claim, use H33-Upstream instead. If you need to prove the binaries running on your servers are the approved ones, use Sentinel instead. To validate high-stakes documents (closings, claims, records), use H33-Vault instead.
If you want the mechanism, not the product. For key custody itself, read H33-Key. For the portable attestation primitive, read H33-74. For the proof/verdict layer, read Verification.